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GLOBAL CRISES, FISCAL IMBALANCES AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY: 
INTERESTS AND REACTIONS OF ASIAN ECONOMIES 
 
 
This  paper  concerns  the  impact  of  global  crises  in  2007-9  on  Asian  economies.  
Before addressing that issue, however, the first three sections argue that what is often 
abbreviated to GFC included three distinct crises: 
1.  a financial sector crisis, which was not global.  The North Atlantic financial 
crisis of 2007-8 hit some small economies (Iceland, Ireland), but the big news 
was the USA and UK and to a lesser degree some other EU members. 
2.  recession in the USA and UK triggered a global economic crisis in 2008-9 
3.  public  finance  crises  resulted  from  large  bail-out  or  stimulus  packages 
exacerbated by falling taxes due to recession (as in Ireland, USA, UK), or to 
some extent coincidentally (e.g. Greece due to culmination of budget deficits 
fuelled by cheap debt since joining the euro).  If central banks are committed 
to low inflation, then increased budget deficits mean larger public debts and 
potential sovereign debt crises. 
An important distinction between the first two types of crises is that the effects of a 
financial crisis are much longer lasting than those of an economic crisis triggered by 
an  external    shock,  such  as  reduced  demand  for  exports.
1  The implications of a 
sovereign  debt  crisis  are  national ,  but  may  have  regional  implications  (e.g.  for 
eurozone members) or global implications (e.g. if there are doubts about US debts). 
The fourth section analyses the impact of these crises on Asian countries.  The 
Asia-Pacific  region  did  not  experience  significant  financial  crises.    The  open 
economies were affected by the global economic crisis, but they recovered relatively 
rapidly after a drop in exports and in economic growth in 2009.  An important 
consequence is that the weight of Asian economies in the global economy, which had 
been increasing for sever al decades,  grew even more rapidly in 2009 -11 as  the 
economies  of  the  USA  and  Europe  faltered.  This  poses  challenges  for  global 
economic  governance,  which  is  dominated  by  the  USA  and  western  European 
countries.  However, there are constraints on Asia being a more assertive force, due to 
the competition for leadership among the larger economies and limited leadership 
resources in the smaller economies.  
                                                 
1 Eichengreen (2011, 386-9) provides recent references, and discusses the difficulty of determining the 
counterfactual with which to compare the aftermath of financial crises. 2 
 
 
1. The North Atlantic Financial Crisis of 2007-8 
 
The USA experienced a major financial crisis in 2007-8.  The trigger was falling 
house prices from a mid-2006 peak, which led to the subprime mortgage crisis.  The 
crisis was realized in April 2007 when New Century Financial filed for bankruptcy, 
and in the remainder of 2007 many institutions announced losses associated with 
delinquent mortgages.  An additional component of the US financial crisis was the 
collapse of the investment banks which first became apparent in March 2008  when 
Bear Stearns was bought by JP Morgan Chase in a fire sale (paying $240 million for 
a company worth $18 billion a year earlier) supported by a $30 billion loan from the 
Fed. 
The US financial crisis peaked in September 2008.  On September 7 the U.S. 
government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into a conservatorship, effectively 
nationalizing  them  at  the  taxpayers'  expense.    On  15  September  2008  Lehman 
Brothers went bankrupt and Merrill Lynch was bought by Bank of America.  The 
following  day  the  Fed  announced  an  $85  billion  rescue  package  for  AIG,  the 
country's biggest insurance company, in return for an 80% stake in the firm.  On 25 
September  2008  Washington  Mutual,  which  had  assets  valued  at  $307  billion, 
was closed down by regulators and sold to JPMorgan Chase. 
The US government moved quickly to provide support for the financial sector. 
On  28  September  US  lawmakers  announced  a  bipartisan  agreement  on  a  rescue 
package, allowing the Treasury to spend up to $700 billion buying bad debts from 
ailing banks.  The plan was rejected by Congress the next day, but a revised plan was 
passed on 3 October.  On 14 October the US government unveiled a $250 billion 
plan to purchase stakes in a variety of banks in an effort to restore confidence in the 
sector.  On 23 November the US government announced a $20 billion rescue plan for 
Citigroup after its shares plunged by more than 60% in a week.  On 25 November the 
Fed announced that it would inject a further $800 billion into the economy to stabilise 
the financial system and encourage lending; about $600 billion would  be used to buy 
up mortgage-backed securities while $200 billion would  be targeted at unfreezing 
the consumer credit market. 
More  or  less  at  the  same  time  and  speed,  the  UK  faced  a  financial  crisis 
triggered by mortgage loans.  In September 2007, Northern Rock sought and received 3 
 
a liquidity support facility from the Bank of England and in February 2008 Northern 
Rock  was  taken  into  state  ownership;  the  bank's  principal  problem  was  non-
performing mortgage loans.    In September 2008 the mortgage lender  Bradford  & 
Bingley  was  nationalized;  the  British  government  took  control  of  the  bank's  £50 
billion mortgages and loans, while its savings operations and branches were sold to 
Santander.  The banking crisis spread and on 3 October 2008 the UK government 
announced plans to pump £37 billion of taxpayers' money into three banks: Royal 
Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB and HBOS. 
In  September  and  October  2008  other  large  EU  economies  faced  specific 
banking  problems,  which  were  met  by  bail-outs,  but  the  systemic  impact  was 
nowhere  near  as  large  as  in  the  UK.    For  example,  the  Belgian,  French  and 
Luxembourg governments contributed 6.4 billion euros to bail out Dexia, and the 
German government announced a €50 billion deal to save Hypo Real Estate.  A much 
larger national crisis occurred in Ireland, whose government foolishly guaranteed all 
deposits in the country's main banks.  Relative to the size of the national economy, 
the largest banking crisis was in Iceland, whose banking system collapsed in October 
2008, leading the government to negotiate a $2 billion loan from the International 
Monetary Fund, the first IMF loan to a western European country since for over a 
quarter of a century. 
Other countries, notably in eastern Europe, experienced financial crises which 
were related to the difficulties of western European banks or to a sudden stop in 
capital inflows.  In Central Asia, Kazakhstan had a financial crisis that was largely 
home-grown, resulting from a real estate bubble that was fuelled in part by foreign 
depositors and that burst in 2007. 
A striking feature of the 2007-8 financial crises was that they did not have 
serious  transcontinental  contagion  effects.    The  1997-8  Asian  Crisis  triggered  a 
reconsideration of emerging market debts that led to crises in Brazil and Russia, with 
the latter contributing to the Long Term Capital Management crisis in the USA.  In 
2007-8  there  was  no  financial  crisis  in  South  America,  Africa  or  Asia.    Even 
countries closely linked to the US economy, notably Canada, had no financial crisis.  
Although  financial  liberalization,  and  the  associated  pre-2007  economic  boom, 
contributed to the likelihood of a crisis, Australia illustrated that a crisis was not 
inevitable. 4 
 
In the USA and the UK the financial crisis was over by the end of 2008.  In the 
first half of 2009 most banks were back to good health.  In June 2009 ten of the 
largest US banks announced that they would be able to repay the US Treasury the 
money they were lent under the October 2008 bail-out.  Goldman Sachs announced a 
net profit of $3.44 billion for April to June, and set aside $6.65 billion for pay and 
bonuses  in  the  quarter.  In  the  UK,  Barclays  announced  an 8%  rise  in  first-half 
profits, and other banks announced mixed results for the period (profits at HSBC and 
RBS, losses at Lloyds and Northern Rock).
2  In both countries the popular focus had 
shifted from worrying over a financial crisi s to outrage over high earnings in the 
financial sector. 
The financial crises were important for their impact on the real sector.  As 
people's financial and real estate wealth declined, aggregate demand fell, starting 
with  deferred  purchase  of  consumer  dur ables.
3  Already  by  December  2008 
governments in the USA and EU were becoming as worried about the health of their 
automobile  sector as about that of the financial sector.  On  4 December  French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy unveiled a 26 billion euro stimulus plan, with money to be 
spent on public sector investments and loans for the country's carmakers.  On  19 
December  President George W Bush announced that the US government would use 
up to $17.4 billion of the $700 billion meant for the banking sector  to help the Big 
Three US carmakers, and on  29 December the US Treasury unveiled a $6 billion 
bail-out for GMAC, the car-loan arm of General Motors.  Over the following year the 
US and EU economies would experience a deep recession, whose impact would be 
transmitted to the rest of the world through reduced demand for imports. 
 
2. The Global Economic Crisis of 2009 
 
In 2008 average growth in the high-income countries had slowed to a standstill and in 
2009  their  GDP  fell  by  3.5  percent  (Table  1).    The  decline  was  driven  by  the 
recessions  in  the  USA  and  UK  and  was  transmitted  through  reduced  demand  for 
                                                 
2 The common pattern was that, although some financial institutions were hard hit (albeit with  a blow 
often softened by public assistance), other banks, such as Barclays, benefitted from selective purchase 
of assets  sold by the ailing institutions or by their liquidators. 
3 This contributed to falling share prices.  The world's stock markets fell by about a third in the final 
quarter of 2008, in  many countries continuing to decline to a trough in the first or second quarter of 
2009, which added to the negative wealth effect on aggregate demand. 5 
 
imports, which first hit countries exporting consumer durables whose purchase could 
be postponed, e.g. car exporters in Japan, Germany and France.
4  By the start of 2009 
the volume of world exports had fallen to about three -quarters of their level in April 
2008, and alarm bells were sounding  about the scale of the decline in world trade 
(Baldwin and Evenett, 2009); analysis of the causes was in full swing by November 
(Baldwin, 2009), although by then trade volumes were starting to recover.
5  Over the 
year 2009 the world's real output fell by  0.5 percent, after growing by 3 percent per 
year in 2000-8, and the volume of trade in goods and services fell by 10.9 percent 
(IMF, 2011, Table A9).  In sum, the financial crisis was not global, but , when the 
world's two largest importers (the EU and USA) run into a serious domestic recession, 
the world economy is affected. 
The global economic crisis struck countries with differing degrees of severity.  
Countries which suffered both from a financial crisis and the slowdown in global 
demand inevitably saw  large dips in economic activity.  The countries of eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, which had grown rapidly over the prev ious 
decade and in many cases had become closely connected to the economies of the pre-
2004 EU15, saw the largest declines in output in 2009 (Table 1).  In some cases, 
notably the Baltic countries and Bulgaria, the immediate effect was exacerbate d by a 
strong policy response in the form of cutting budget deficits, driving an internal 
devaluation (i.e. falling wages and prices) while maintaining a fixed exchange rate.
6  
Countries  less  integrated  into  the  global  economy ,  i.e.  primarily  low -income 
countries, were relatively less impacted by the global crisis. 
A  noteworthy  pattern  was  that  emerging  market  economies  as  a  group 
weathered the storm better than the high-income countries.  Several authors confirm 
that GDP growth declined less in emerging economies, e ven after controlling for 
                                                 
4 Alessandria et al. (2010; 2011) show that sales of foreign cars began to decline in the USA in mid-
2008 and the ratio of inventories to sales increased by 45 percent over the next six months.  Car sales 
began to revive in early 2009, but imports only picked up after inventories had been run down. 
5 Some authors saw a direct link between the financial crises and the decline in trade. Ahn, Amiti, and 
Weinstein (2011) claim that financial factors may explain about 20 to 30 percent of the decline in 
world trade that occurred in the 2008 -2009 crisis, and they support this claim by showing that the 
prices of manufactured exports rose relative to domestic prices during the crisis and that U.S. seaborne 
exports and imports, which they assume to be more sensitive to trade finance problems, saw their prices 
rise relative to goods shipped by air or land.   Others have argued that trade finance was  not a major 
contributor to reduced trade volume in 2008-9.  One difficulty is the lack of hard data on trade finance  
(Korinek, Le Cocguic and Sourdin, 2010). 
6 Aslund (2011) argues that the policy response helped the countries  to a rapid recovery and improved 
long-term growth prospects. 6 
 
several variables (Frankel and Saravelos, 2010; Rose and Spiegel, 2010; Rose, 2011).   
Didier et al. (2011) argue that, using the drop from pre-crisis highs as the criterion, 
there is no significant difference between high-income and emerging economies, but 
they  acknowledge  that  emerging  economies  recovered  faster  and  as  a  group  had 
returned  to  pre-crisis  levels  of  industrial  output  in  2010,  whereas  high-income 
countries did not achieve this until 2011.  A superior recovery was evident in the large 
emerging economies with sound economic policies before the crisis, such as China, 
India, Brazil and Indonesia. 
 
Table 1: Growth by Region, 2000-2010 
 
  Ave 2000-7  2008  2009  2010 
High income countries  2.4  0.3  -3.5  2.6 
Asia  7.7  6.5  5.1  8.8 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia  6.1  4.1  -5.4  3.9 
Latin America & Caribbean  3.6  4.1  -2.0  5.8 
Middle East & Africa  5.5  5.3  1.6  4.3 
 
Source: real GDP growth from IMF World Economic Outlook, as reported in Didier et al. (2011, 33). 
Notes: regional averages are weighted by 2007 nominal GDP in USD; high income countries are as 
defined by the World Bank July 2010 classification; Asia includes South and East Asia except 
Japan, and Pacific except Australia and New Zealand. 
 
Why did emerging economies ride out the crisis so calmly?  They were open 
economies  and  hence  exposed  to  sharp  drops  in  export  demand.    However,  trade 
shocks typically are shorter-lasting than financial crises, which may be followed by a 
lengthy period of deleveraging and domestic recession.  Moreover, and in contrast to 
earlier  decades,  many  emerging  economies  had  shifted  from  being  net  external 
debtors to net creditors and held liquid foreign assets (e.g. in the form of reserve 
assets) and illiquid foreign liabilities (e.g. as direct foreign investment), so they were 
not  exposed  to  a  sudden  deterioration  in  the  capital  account  of  the  balance  of 
payments.  Finally, some countries, notably China, introduced pre-emptive stimulus 
packages to prevent the initial negative shock from turning into a major recession.
7 
 
3. Public Finance Crises 
                                                 
7 Warnings by the US government of systemic risk and a new Great Depression contributed to global 
uncertainty (Taylor, 2009).  The media working out of the north-eastern USA and London, spooked by 
the dramatic US and UK financial collapses in September and October 2008, may have contributed to 
panic among policymakers in late 2008, even in countries which experienced no financial crisis such as 
Australia or China.  7 
 
 
By 2010 all regions of the world were enjoying positive economic growth.  However, 
the sense of crisis persisted as a number of countries experienced difficulties reducing 
their public sector deficit and ran into debt problems.  Some of these debt crises were 
related  to  the  financial  crisis  in  cases  where  governments  had  been  involved  in 
expensive  bail-outs  (e.g.  Ireland)  and  others  to  the  size  of  the  stimulus  packages 
adopted to deal with the economic crisis (e.g. the USA and UK), while other debt 
crises were essentially independent of the financial and economic crises but came at a 
bad time (e.g. Greece). 
In  2010-11,  public  sector  budget  crises  were  debt  crises  because  all 
governments were committed to not monetizing budget deficits.  This was, of course, 
not  an  option  for  individual  eurozone  countries  or  for  countries  with  debt 
denominated in foreign currencies, but (at least up to the time of writing) neither the 
USA, the UK nor the ECB appear to be contemplating the inflation option.  Moreover, 
they were to a large extent external debt crises because foreigners held large amounts 
of the sovereign debt (or government-guaranteed private debt) of the USA, Ireland, 
Greece and other highly indebted countries. Any default by the USA would have 
systemic effects because US Treasury bills are the benchmark risk-free access for the 
international financial system. 
The eurozone sovereign debt crises had varying origins.  The Irish government 
made one foolish policy decision, guaranteeing all creditors of the major Irish banks 
and had to pay a large price for that error.
8  The Greek government benefitted from 
lower borrowing rates after it adopted the euro to run non-transparent budget deficits, 
including for prestige projects like the 2004 Olympic Games.  A Greek default was a 
potential contagion event for two reasons.  First, it sounded a warning to creditors that 
they should check whether other eurozone countries had been borrowing heavily on 
the basis of low interest rates which ignored individual countries' default risk; they 
                                                 
8 This was a choice.  The Icelandic government pointedly refused to guarantee foreign deposits in 
Icelandic banks that went under, and stuck to this position despite heavy pressure from the UK and 
Netherlands in both of which subsidiaries of Icelandic banks had attracted large numbers of depositors.  
Whelan (2011) argues that the Irish economy already faced serious problems in 2007-8 after a real 
estate bubble had burst, which made it even more incredible that the government on 30 September 
2008 announced a near-blanket guarantee to the creditors of Irish banks.  When Allied Irish Bank's 
losses were assessed at €30 billion in September 2010 and the government issued promissory notes to 
cover the bank's debts, Ireland's budget deficit reached 32% of GDP.   By spring 2011 the total bill to 
Irish taxpayers for bank bailouts had exceeded €70 billion, for a country of less than 4.5 million people. 8 
 
found Portugal, which like Portugal had been running large current account deficits 
since introducing the euro (Table 2).
9 
 
Table 2: Balance on Current Account, Selected Countries, 2003-2010 
(percent of GDP) 
 
  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
USA  –4.7  –5.3  –5.9  –6.0  –5.1  –4.7  –2.7  –3.2 
Canada  1.2  2.3  1.9  1.4  0.8  0.4  –2.8  –2.8 
UK  –1.6  –2.1  –2.6  –3.4  –2.6  –1.6  –1.7  –2.5 
Eurozone  0.4  1.2  0.4  0.4  0.2  –0.6  –0.2  0.1 
   Germany   1.9  4.7  5.1  6.5  7.6  6.7  5.0  5.3 
   France  0.7   0.5  –0.5  –0.6  –1.0  –1.9  –1.9  –2.1 
   Italy  –1.3   –0.9  –1.7  –2.6  –2.4  –2.9  –2.1  –3.5 
   Spain  –3.5  –5.3  –7.4  –9.0  –10.0  –9.7  –5.5  –4.5 
   Netherlands  5.6   7.6  7.4  9.3  6.7  4.3  4.6  7.1 
   Belgium  3.4   3.2  2.0  1.9  1.6  –1.9  0.8  1.2 
   Austria  1.7   2.2  2.2  2.8  3.5  4.9  2.9  3.2 
   Greece  –6.6  –5.9  –7.4  –11.2  –14.4  –14.7  –11.0  –10.4 
   Portugal  –6.5  –8.4  –10.4  –10.7  –10.1  –12.6  –10.9  –9.9 
   Finland  4.8   6.2  3.4  4.2  4.3  2.9  2.3  3.1 
   Ireland  –0.0  –0.6  –3.5  –3.6  –5.3  –5.6  –3.0  –0.7 
Japan  3.2   3.7  3.6  3.9  4.8  3.2  2.8  3.6 
China  2.8  3.6  7.1  9.3  10.6  9.6  6.0  5.2 
India  1.5  0.1  –1.3  –1.0  –0.7  –2.0  –2.8  –3.2 
Korea  2.4  4.5  2.2  1.5  2.1  0.3  3.9  2.8 
Taiwan  9.8   5.8  4.8  7.0  8.9  6.9  11.4  9.4 
Indonesia  3.5  0.6  0.1  3.0  2.4  0.0  2.6  0.9 
Malaysia  12.0   12.1  15.0  16.4  15.9  17.5  16.5  11.8 
Philippines  0.4  1.9  2.0  4.5  4.9  2.2  5.8  4.5 
Singapore  22.7   17.0  21.1  24.8  27.3  14.6  19.0  22.2 
Thailand  3.4   1.7  –4.3  1.1  6.3  0.8  8.3  4.6 
 
Source:  IMF  World  Economic  Outlook,  April  2011  (Tables  A11  and  A12),  at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/tables.pdf (accessed 9 September 2011). 
Notes: Eurozone calculated as the sum of the balances of individual Euro Area countries excluding 
Estonia. 
 
A second source of contagion arose because banks in other eurozone countries 
held large amounts of the sovereign debt or, equally disastrous, loans to Greek banks 
that would go under if the Greek government defaulted.  This was especially true for 
banks in EU countries, such as France and Germany, which had not been involved in 
                                                 
9  Current  account  deficits  may  be  a  sign  of  dynamism  if  their  counterpart  is  capital  inflows  in 
productive investments.  They signal future problems if the deficit is being used to fund private or 
public consumption.  9 
 
pre-2008 real-estate lending to the same extent as banks in Spain, Ireland or the UK.  
The French and German banks weathered the 2008 financial storm better, but in 2010 
found  themselves  over-exposed  to  Greek  borrowers.  Thus,  EU  leaders,  with  the 
French President and German Chancellor in the vanguard, spent much energy in 2010 
and 2011 organizing relief for Greece, ideally to avoid default but at a minimum to 
buy time so that foreign banks and others could reorganize their balance sheets before 
formal default occurred.
10  As long as the eurozone's debt problems are restricted to 
the smaller member economies, these are largely  regional matters, centring on the 
fundamental question of whether eurozone or EU members are jointly and severally 
responsible for the union's sovereign debts, but if the debt problems spread to Spain or 
Italy or if the French or German banking sectors experience a major  crisis then there 
will be impacts on the global economy. 
The debt crises, earlier financial crises and debt resolution programs illustrate 
the ubiquity of time inconsistency problems in the sense that short -run measures 
which buy  popularity  for  governments  may  have  adverse  long -run implications.  
Governments which had accumulated assets in sovereign wealth funds (e.g. Chile or 
Kazakhstan) or as reserves held by the central bank had foregone opportunities to 
spend  during  the   boom,  but  were  better  placed  to  weather  the  storm  in  2009.  
Countries  which  used  crises  as  opportunities  to  cut  out  wasteful  government 
expenditures and carry out difficult but desirable reforms (e.g. the Baltic  countries) 
experienced deeper recessions but emerged   in better shape.  On the other hand, 
countries that spent money rather indiscriminately as stimulus packages, including 
Australia and China, may have gained short-term breathing spaces at the cost of long-
term problems.
11 
Another apparent dilemma was that  countries more integrated into the global 
economy or with more liberal financial sectors were likely to be hit the hardest, 
                                                 
10 Some confusion surrounds the term ""default", in part because formal default would trigger the need 
for pension funds and others to hold a fire sale of assets issued by the issuer in default.  As Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009) point out, however, any outcome which leaves creditors short of their contracted 
real returns, including "voluntary" rescheduling or inflation, is tantamount to default.  
11  The  Chinese  stimulus  program  introduced  in  2008Q4  includ ed  RMB  1.18  trillion  in  central 
government  funding,  but  more  importantly  it  unleashed  massive  spending  from  sub -national 
governments much of which was funded by local investment corporations ( difang  zhengfu  rongzi 
pingtai) whose activities are often non-transparent; LICs had been successful in promoting growth, e.g. 
in Shanghai which had provided the inspiration for the model, but before 2009 they tried to maintain a 
low profile.  The stimulus announcement released any perceived political constraints on the LICs' scale 
of activities, and in 2009 the actual gross stimulus from all levels of government reached about a fifth 
of GDP (Wong, 2011). 10 
 
whereas countries outside the global economy were insulated from the crises.  This is, 
however, not an argument for autarchy or financial reregulation.  Countries with more 
liberal financial sectors enjoyed superior growth in the decades before 2007 which far 
exceeded the size of the decline in GDP in 2008-9 (Pomfret, 2010); Table 3 provides 
some comparisons.  The gains from financial liberalization are primarily in terms of 
improved  allocation  of  capital  rather  than  increased  saving  and  investment,  as 
evidenced from financially repressed economies in the twentieth century,
12 and also in 
recent empirical work based on a broader range of countries (Kukenova, 2011;  Buera 
et al., 2011).  These benefits tend to be more pronounced in the longer term, although 
financial liberalization inevitably exposes an economy to greater volatility. 
 
Table 3: GDP in Current US Dollars (billions), 1992-2007 
 
  1992  2007  % change      1992  2007  % change 
USA  6,286.8  13,811.2  119.7    Germany  2,062.1  3,297.2  59.9 
UK  1,074.0  2,727.8  154.0    France  1,372.8  2,562.3  86.6 
Spain  612.6  1,429.2  133.3    Italy  1,265.8  2,107.5  66.5 
Ireland  54.3  255.0  369.6    Greece  128.4  360.0  180.4 
Australia  320.6  821.7  156.3           




19,764.1  38,219.0  93.4    World  24,533.6  54,347.0  121.5 
 
Source: Pomfret (2010, 26) -- data from World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 
 
4. Implications for Asia 
 
There was no significant financial crisis in Asia (except Kazakhstan, and that was 
largely  home-grown).    There  was  an  economic  crisis  in  2009,  but  recovery  was 
relatively rapid and Asian countries' share in world trade continues to increase.  There 
are no public finance crises, as in the USA and Europe, although some governments 
                                                 
12 Countries which repressed their financial sectors during the1950s and 1960s import-substitution era 
suffered negative consequences for long-term economic growth; there was little loss of savings because 
the interest elasticity of supply of saving is low, but excess demand for loans at low interest rates was 
associated with misallocation of capital (Fry, 1988).  The inefficient allocation of capital was indicated 
by increasing incremental capital-output ratios (ICORs) in countries like India or the Soviet Union in 
the 1970s and 1980s.  India’s ICOR increased from 4-4.5 in the first half of the 1960s to a peak of 10.5 
in 1975 (reported in the Asian Development Bank’s Asian Economic Outlook 1990, p. 138), i.e. an 
additional unit of capital made less than half the contribution to output in 1976 than it had made a 
dozen years earlier.  In the Soviet Union the ICOR increased from 3.7 in the period 1950-60, to 5.0 in 
1960-75 and 14.8 in 1975-85 (Gregory, 1994, 129). 11 
 
undertook large prophylactic stimulus packages (e.g. China and Australia), and some 
faced independent shocks (notably Japan's natural disaster in March 2011).  These are 
ad  hoc  and  need  not  be  long-term  negatives  (although  they  could  turn  out  to  be 
negative if the monies were poorly used or if returning to prudent budgets is difficult). 
An important reason for Asian financial stability in the first decade of the 
twenty-first  century  was  the  lessons  drawn  from  the  1997-8  Asian  Crisis.    The 
strongest image from that event was of the managing director of the IMF standing 
over the President of Indonesia who was signing a  loan request, and many in the 
region  resolved  to  reduce  their  dependence  on  the  Euro-US-dominated  IMF.    A 
Japanese  push  for  greater  Asian  financial  integration  and  creation  of  Asian 
multilateral financial institutions met with little success.
13  Countries did not want to 
compromise their monetary policy autonomy and looked to their own defen ces by 
building up national reserves (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Foreign Reserves held by Emerging and Developing Countries, 
2003-2010 (billion US dollars) 
 
  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Total  1,341   1,792  2,304  3,073  4,369  4,950  5,597  6,481 
Developing Asia  670  935  1,156  1,489  2,129  2,534  3,078  3,658 
   China  409  616  823  1,070  1,531  1,950  2,418  2,890 
   India  100  127  133  171  268  248  266  292 
CIS and CEE  206  282  378  564  813  764  813  902 
   Russia  74  122  176  296  468  413  418  456 
LAC  195  221  255  310  445  497  548  651 
  Brazil  49  53  53  85  180  193  237  288 
  Mexico  59   64  74  76  87  95  100  120 
MENA  230  294  434  596  837  1,000  1,001  1,108 
SSA  39  61  81  114  145  156  158  162 
 
Source:  IMF  World  Economic  Outlook,  April  2011  (Table  A15),  at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/tables.pdf (accessed 9 September 2011). 
Notes: CIS= Commonwealth of Independent States, CEE = Central and Eastern Europe, LAC = Latin 
American countries, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
By 2010 China and Japan were the largest holders of US Treasury securities, 
with over two trillion dollars between them, and South Korea and Taiwan also held 
large  amounts  of  US  government  debt.  The  desirability  of  monetary  stability  to 
                                                 
13 The 2000 Chiang Mai Initiative, a swap arrangement among the ASEAN+3 group (the ten ASEAN 
members plus China, Japan and South Korea), was expanded and multilateralized in 2009, but the 
amounts remained small compared to, say, the credit lines some of the participants had with the US Fed 
and the facility proved to be redundant during the 2008-9 crises (Pomfret, 2011, 58-73). 12 
 
facilitate trade was, however, recognized; governments generally maintained a loose 
de facto dollar peg and low inflation, so that bilateral real exchange rates within East 
Asia did not fluctuate greatly in the 2000s. 
A  second  and  more  long-term  lesson  taken  from  the  Asian  Crisis  was  the 
desirability of reducing dependence on international financial markets by building up 
Asian  bond  markets.      Artificial  attempts  to  stimulate  Asian  bonds  made  limited 
progress  but  by  2010  some  domestic  bond  markets  had  become  substantial,  and 
between 2010Q2 and 2011Q2 local currency bond markets in emerging East Asia 
grew by almost eight percent to US$5.5 trillion, of which China accounted for $3,052 
billion, South Korea $1,149 billion, Malaysia $247 billion, Thailand $225 billion, 
Singapore  $179  billion  and  Indonesia  $107  billion  (ADB,  2011,  5-6).
14    Capital 
inflows were primarily in the form of foreign direct investment, which in combination 
with the large official reserve assets holdings, meant that the Asian countries were in 
the happy position of having external assets  which were  more  liquid than their 
external liabilities (in contrast to the situation faced by the crisis countries in 1997 
which suffered a sudden and large call on their external liabilities). 
Whatever the role of these individual drivers, East Asian countries have not 
experienced  a  financial  crisis  in  the  twent y-first  century,  despite  the  events  of 
September 2008 in New York and London.  Financial markets showed concern about 
the creditworthiness of some Asian countries, but the  concern was misplaced.  In 
October-November 2008 credit default swap spreads soared to 1200 basis points for 
Indonesia and lower (but still high) peaks for the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea 
and others, but the spreads fell during 2009 and by the end of 2010 the spreads were 
less than 200 basis points for all Asian countries, which was less than the spreads for 
Italy or Spain (ADB, 2011, 5). 
Since 2000 Asian economic integration has  centred on a network of bilateral 
trade agreements, especially in East Asia .  This has been  driven by the increased 
density of regional value chains, and perhaps by lack of progress on trade facilitation 
in the Doha Development Round (Pomfret, 2011).  A consequence of the value chains 
is that the extent of the decline of global trade, which is measured by summing gross 
value at each border crossing, relative to the decline in GDP, which is measured by 
summing value-added, was exaggerated.  Factory Asia was hit in 2009 because North 
                                                 
14  Emerging  East  Asia  is  defined  here  as  China,  Hong  Kong,  South  Korea,  Malaysia  Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 13 
 
America and Western Europe are still major markets for the final products of the 
regional value chains, but this is changing as consumers in regional markets become 
more affluent.  Between 2009 and 2011, the Chinese economy grew from just under 
$5 trillion to $6.5 trillion and the Indian economy from $1.3 to $1.7 trillion, while 
ASEAN has a combined GDP of over $1.5 trillion.
15 
In sum, East Asia did not suffer a major crisis in 2008-9 - certainly nowhere 
near as bad as that of 1997-8 - and the reasons for that are sound.
16  Creation of deeper 
domestic financial markets, avoidance of large balance of payments or public sector 
deficits, outward-oriented trade policies and specialization by comparative advantage 
are all part of a recipe for continued economic growth.  Such gr owth will narrow the 
income gap between East Asia and the USA and European countries which continue 
to experience deleveraging and slow growth.  Such a major shift in global economic 
weight poses challenges to the system of multilateral institutions establ ished in the 
1940s and other fora for global economic governance. 
The G7/G8 grouping has been challenged by  the rise of the G20 which 
includes  six  Asian  economies  (not  counting  Russia):  Australia,  China,  India, 
Indonesia, Japan and South Korea.  However, despite dissatisfaction in Asia the IMF 
and World Bank remain US/EU dominated, e.g. with no Asian candidate to challenge 
Christine Lagarde's IMF nomination in 2011.  These situations are clearly unstable. 
By contrast, the emerging Asian economies have managed to make substantial 
progress in liberalizing trade to meet the needs of their strengthening regional value 
chains.    T he  WTO  is  the  only  one  of  the  three  major  economic  multilateral  
organizations  that  has  had  an  Asian  head ,  and  there  is  almost  universal  WTO 
membership and acceptance of its international trade law and dispute  resolution 
mechanisms.  The slow process of multilateral trade negotiations was augmented by 
substantial unilateral trade liberalization in East Asia and trade facilitation measures 
within ASEAN, and these patterns continue in bilateral and plurilateral agreements 
and in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).   A regional approach to trade 
liberalization may be second-best, but as tariffs diminish in importance and interest 
centres  on  trade  facilitation  it  is  less  likely  that  regional  agreements  will  be 
                                                 
15 For more details see Sanchita Basu Das "Asia Holds Promise as US, Eurozone Falter", The Business 
Times (Singapore), 24 August 2011. 
16 Asia may  have been helped by the collapse of commodity prices in 2008-9.  14 
 
discriminatory and more likely that measures such as simplified customs procedures 
or single windows will benefit all trading partners.
17  
There are, however, constraints on a concerted  Asian push for greater global 
influence.  The region  lacks a  clear hegemon, and  is characterized by  pervasive 
competition between the big states (China -Japan, and to lesser extent In dia) and 
historically based distrust (China-Japan-Korea); there has been no counterpart to the 
post-1945  Franco-German  agreement  on  Europe  or  the  North  Atlantic  security 
alliance.  In the emerging economies there is a further constraint of scarce leadership 
resources, which is perhaps exacerbated by domestic political uncertainties in China, 
India, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, and elsewhere.  At the same time, in southeast 
Asia ASEAN does not have even  the limited degree of unity of th e EU, and the 
governments  of  other  large  ASEAN  econ omies  may  have  reservations  about 




Asia weathered the global economic recession of 2008-9 remarkably well.  This was 
partly  because  no  country  in  East  Asia,  South  Asia  or  Australasia  experienced  a 
financial crisis.  These countries were well-placed to deal with an external trade shock 
because their economic growth in the twenty-first century had been based on firm 
foundations, and many countries had built up substantial foreign exchange reserves or 
sovereign wealth funds which provided a cushion against any balance of payments 
problems.  Moreover, even given these potential stabilizing force, some of the larger 
regional  economies,  notably  China  and  Australia,  undertook  massive  pre-emptive 
fiscal stimulus programs.  The only serious long-term implication for the national 
economies is whether those programs can be reversed without significant political 
disruption before the countries run into sovereign debt issues. 
For the global economy, the main challenge posed by the relative success of 
Asian economies as the USA and western Europe went through major recessions is 
whether this will be the catalyst for reform of the multilateral economic institutions 
established over sixty years ago by the World War II victors.  Agreements such as the 
                                                 
17 Asian regional agreements in the 1990s and 2000s are described and analysed in Pomfret (2011).  
Pomfret and Sourdin (2009) provide evidence of trade facilitation within ASEAN also reducing the 
costs of trading with non-members.  15 
 
head of the World Bank being from the USA and the head of the IMF being European 
are clearly anachronistic.  The composition of the G7 has been a little more malleable, 
as it expanded to a G8 in the 1990s after Russia abandoned central planning, and then 
was  superseded  by  the  G20,  but  this  arbitrary  division  between  twenty  important 
countries and the unimportant rest of the world is also unstable, in Asia as much as 
anywhere else.  Economic reasons for why the potential role of Asia in reform of 
these institutions for global economic governance has increased are easy to find, but 
the political constraints within and among Asian countries will impede any clear-cut 
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